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The introduction of generic competitors is tough on a brand-
name drug company, which must face the loss of its monopoly status 
and the resulting severe drop in price. The design of the patent 
system, however, dictates that a patent holder’s right to exclude 
others from the market must end with the expiration of the patent. 
 
Brands and Generics 
 
Today, 88% of all prescriptions in the U.S. are filled using 
generic medication. A generic drug normally enters at a 20% 
discount from the branded medication, and the price falls quickly 
from that point. Eventually, most generics are priced at an 80% to 
85% discount from their name-brand equivalents. The FDA estimates 
that consumers saved over $217 billion in 2012 alone through the use 
of generics, with total savings of $1.68 trillion from 2005 to 2014. 
One might call the generic revolution a miracle, but it certainly 
did not occur naturally or serendipitously. The underlying 
mechanism behind it is particularly complex. Generic drug entry is 
covered by the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration 
Act, commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act. Before the Act, 
generic entry into the market was slow. Passed in 1984, Hatch-
Waxman created a pathway to generic entry meant to incentivize the 
speedy introduction of generic drugs to market by allowing generic 
drug manufacturers to (1) begin the approval process so that they are 
ready to launch as soon as the patent expires, and (2) rely on safety 
and efficacy testing performed for the branded drug. Hatch-Waxman 
also contains incentives to encourage generic companies to challenge 




                                                 
1. Summarized and excerpted from Robin C. Feldman & Evan 
Frondorf, Drug Wars: A New Generation of Generic Pharmaceutical Delay, 
53 HARV. J. LEGIS. 499 (2016). 
62 Scholarship for the Bench [Vol. 1 
 
 
The actual miracle, however, is not the dramatic rise of generics. 
Rather, the miracle is that the benefits of Hatch-Waxman have 
largely held up despite its complexity and the persistent attempts at 
undercutting its aims. Complexity breeds opportunity, and Hatch-
Waxman has created a veritable playground of opportunities that 
pharmaceutical companies have used to hold off generic competition. 
This is understandable. The temptation to avoid the impact of Hatch-
Waxman can be overpowering when even a few months of additional 
monopoly profits can be worth hundreds of millions of dollars or 
more. This encourages companies to expend tremendous energy 
blocking generic entry by any means possible, with some companies 
using ever more clever and complicated strategies. As a result, many 
pharmaceutical firms no longer compete solely on the basis of 
innovation, but also on their ability to manipulate policy mechanisms 
and pathways to extend monopoly and duopoly terms. These 
manipulations can be categorized into three “generations” to 
illustrate the evolution of generic-delay tactics over time. 
In Generation 1.0, delay generally takes the form of “pay-for-
delay” settlements, in which a potential generic manufacturer is 
simply paid by the brand-name drug maker to refrain from entering 
the market until a stipulated date. These settlements were 
commonplace for many years, but the Supreme Court’s 2013 ruling 
in FTC v. Actavis opened the door to antitrust scrutiny. A recent state 
court decision and a large FTC settlement may signal the end of basic 
pay-for-delay. 
Next has come the rise of a new generation of pay-for-delay 
tactics—“Generation 2.0.” Beginning long before Actavis, these 
strategies generally involve the transfer of benefits from the branded 
firm to a generic manufacturer, but not through a simple cash 
settlement. Generation 2.0 agreements include patterns of multiple 
side deals, where two companies settle a number of Hatch-Waxman 
disputes at once, resulting in a net benefit for the generic firm but 
without any large, conspicuous payment. Other instruments include 
overvalued agreements in which the generic delays entry but is paid 
handsomely to promote, manufacture, or otherwise assist the brand-
name company with the sale of its drug. Finally, Generation 2.0 
includes what are called “boy scout clauses”—agreements to behave 
honorably that actually mask anticompetitive collusion. These side 
deals are now themselves facing antitrust scrutiny in the courts. 
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“Generation 3.0” tactics, so far, have been deployed largely 
under the radar. These tactics no longer focus on delay agreements 
with generic competitors but rather on using administrative 
processes, regulatory schemes with connections to Hatch-Waxman, 
and drug modifications to obstruct generics from getting to market. 
Many of these strategies have little justification beyond obstruction 
of generics, and some recent fact patterns are falling further outside 
the boundaries of common sense. These include using so-called 
“citizen petitions” to slow down generic entry, refusing to provide 
samples that generics need for demonstrating bioequivalence, 
refusing to cooperate with generics on safety labels, product-
hopping, and other blocking tactics. Some of these strategies have 
been part of recent schemes to restrict generic substitution while 
simultaneously raising prices of the brand-name drug, leading to a 
swell of public outrage in fall 2015 and the return of pharmaceuticals 




Shining a spotlight on these problematic behaviors and the 
techniques used to mask them leads to ideas for reforming the 
generic-entry pathway. These ideas borrow from systems theory—
looking from the perspective of how different systems interact to 
create opportunities and incentives to correct suboptimal behaviors. 
Moreover, to move the system away from hide-and-seek games, 
standards-based legislation and regulation should be adopted. Most 
important, to avoid “death by tinkering”—that is, adjusting doctrines 
a little here and a little there without comprehensive logic until the 
entire area collapses under its own weight—a more comprehensive 
overhaul of different intersecting regimes should be pursued. Hatch-
Waxman was indeed a brilliant legislative innovation, heralding 
nothing short of a miracle in the reduction of drug costs. Now, it is 
time to consider the next generation of the regime so those miracles 
are not swept away. 
